Principal Economist, European Central Bank (on leave from IMF).
Working on fintech, shadow banking, liquidity, financial regulation, and financial and sovereign crises.
At IMF covered U.S. and Canada (2008-2010), Ireland and Spain (2011-14), Portugal and Ukraine (2014-2017), Korea and Mongolia (2016), China (2017-2018).
- ECB, Principal Economist, DG-Research, 2018-present;
- IMF, Senior Economist, Research Dept., 2010-present (on leave);
- IMF, United States and Canada Desk, 2008-2010;
- Bank of England, 2006-2008;
- PhD, University of Amsterdam, 2008;
- Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-Taking with Martynova and Vlahu Journal of Financial Intermediation forthcoming
- Profitable banks can borrow more and take risk at higher scale.
- Bank Capital: A Seawall Approach with Dagher, Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Tong International Journal of Central Banking forthcoming
- Risk-weighted bank capital of 15-23% would have prevented a majority of banking crises.
- Covered in "Finance and Development".
- Bailouts and Systemic Insurance with Dell'Ariccia Journal of Banking and Finance 2019
- A government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently, despite potential moral hazard effects.
- Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows with Cerutti and Claessens Economic Policy 2017
- Global liquidity is driven by US monetary policy but European bank conditions.
- Summary on VOX.
- Banking and Trading with Boot Review of Finance 2016
- Bank Size, Capital, and Systemic Risk: Some International Evidence with Laeven and Tong Journal of Banking and Finance 2015
- Systemic risk is driven primarily by insufficient capital in large banks.
- Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management Journal of Financial Intermediation 2013
- Effective disclosure complements liquidity buffers in ensuring banks' market access during crises.
- Capital Regulation and Tail Risk with Perotti and Vlahu International Journal of Central Banking 2011
- Better capitalized banks are less likely to accidentally breach the capital requirements, and so may take more risk.
- Summary on VOX.
- The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding with Huang Journal of Financial Intermediation 2011
- The providers of wholesale funding can remain uninformed of bank fundamentals, and trigger inefficient liquidations based on imprecise public information.
- The first paper (2008) to identify short-term wholesale funding as a source of bank vulnerability
- Top citation for "wholesale funding" on Google Scholar.
- Bank Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort Journal of Financial Intermediation 2009
- Bank may hold insufficient liquidity and gamble for LOLR support, especially when other banks do the same.
- Bank Lending in the Knowledge Economy with Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Dalida Kadyrzhanova, and Camelia Minoiu Revise and resubmit
- As corporate assets become more intangible, banks lend less to firms and more to real estate.
- Bank Capital Requirements and Lending in Emerging Markets with Sole Martinez Peria and Andrea Presbitero Revise and resubmit
- The effects of raising capital requirements on lending are small when in a buoyant EM environment.
- Monetary Policy in the Knowledge Economy with Robin Döttling, Dalida Kadyrzhanova, and Camelia Minoiu
- The Dynamics of Nonperforming Loans in Banking Crises with Anil Ari and Sophia Chen
- Credit and Fiscal Multipliers in China with Sophia Chen and Pi-Han Tsai On IMF blog On VoxChina
- China has high fiscal multipliers, but low marginal effects of credit growth on output growth.
- Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (with Jihad Dagher, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven, Hui Tong) IMF Staff Discussion Note 16/04
- Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Stability (with Luc Laeven)
- Bank corporate governance reforms may be useful, but cannot substitute for strong supervision.
- Bank Size and Systemic Risk (with Luc Laeven and Hui Tong) IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/01
- What Is Shadow Banking? IMF WP 14/25
- Defines shadow banking as "all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a public or private backstop to operate."
- How Much Capital Should Banks Have?
- Banks may need 18% risk-weighted capital, 9% leverage to fully absorb asset shocks of the size seen in past crises in OECD countries.
- Competition Policy for Modern Banks IMF WP 13/126 On VOX Covered by Bloomberg
- Competition policy can support financial stability by dealing with "too-big-to fail" and facilitating crisis management.
- Shadow Banking: Economics and Policy (with Stijn Claessens, Zoltan Poszar, and Manmohan Singh) IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/12 On VOX
- Two key shadow banking functions -- securitization and collateral intermediation -- may be economically valuable but can pose systemic risk.
- New Risks in Financial Intermediation, in IMF Global Financial Stability Report Oct 2012
- Significant changes in the structure of the financial sector over the last decade have led to new systemic risks.
- Externalities and Macroprudential Policy (with Gianni De Nicolo and Giovanni Favara) IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/05 On VOX
- The economic rationale of macroprudential policy is to correct risk externalities across financial institutions and from finance to the real economy.
- Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (with Rocco Huang, 2009), IMF WP 09/152 On VOX
- Depository funding was a key determinant of banks stability during the 2008 crisis.
Other policy work
- Country experience
- Desk for United States (monetary policy) and Canada (monetary policy and financial sector) during 2008-2010.
- Mission work in Korea (2016: corporate restructuring, financial sector, macroprudential policies)
- Reviewer for Ireland and Spain (2011-14), Portugal (2014-2017), Ukraine (2014-2018), Mongolia (2016), and China (2017-2018).
- Ad hoc work on EU issues, including A Banking Union for the Euro Area IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/01
- Financial sector issues
- Benefits and Costs of Corporate Debt Restructuring: An Estimation for Korea (with Jae Chung) 2016 IMF WP 16/204
- Global Liquidity: Issues for Surveillance, IMF Board Paper, April 2014
- Bank Funding and Financial Stability, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013
- Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy, IMF Policy Paper, September 2013 See also a Background Paper
- Progress toward a Safer Financial System, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2012
- Inflation Expectations and Commodity Prices, U.S. Article IV 2011 (with Oya Celasun and Roxana Mihet) IMF WP 12/89 A short version
- A Fair and Substantial Contribution, an IMF Report to G20 on Financial Sector Taxation, 2010
- Government-Sponsored Financial Institutions in Advanced Economies (with Aditya Narain, 2006) IMF WP 07/227
- At the Bank of England:
- Lev Ratnovski is Principal Economist at the European Central Bank (Directorate General Research), on leave from the International Monetary Fund (Research Department). At the IMF, Mr. Ratnovski worked on financial regulation and structure, financial and sovereign crises, and shadow banking and global liquidity. Also, he covered for the IMF economic policy in China, Korea, Mongolia, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Ukraine. Prior to this, Mr. Ratnovski worked on U.S. and Canada desks of the IMF and in the Financial Stability directorate of the Bank of England. He has published in Review of Finance, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Banking and Finance, International Journal of Central Banking, and Economic Policy. Mr. Ratnovski has been cited by Bloomberg, Economist, and Reuters. Mr. Ratnovski holds a B.Sc. from HSE-Moscow and a Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam.