Lead Economist, ECB (on leave from IMF). Working on fintech, liquidity, regulation, and crises.
At IMF covered Canada, China, Ireland, Korea, Mongolia, Portugal, Spain, Ukraine, and U.S.
ECB, Lead Economist, DG-Research, 2018-present;
IMF, Senior Economist, Research Dept., 2010-present (on leave);
IMF, United States and Canada Desk, 2008-2010;
Bank of England, 2006-2008;
PhD, University of Amsterdam, 2008.
Bank Lending in the Knowledge Economy with Dell'Ariccia, Kadyrzhanova, and Minoiu Review of Financial Studies accepted
As corporate assets become more intangible, banks lend less to firms and more to real estate.
Bank Profitability, Leverage Constraints, and Risk-Taking with Martynova and Vlahu Journal of Financial Intermediation 2020
Profitable banks can borrow more and take risk at higher scale.
Bank Capital Requirements and Lending in Emerging Markets with Martinez Peria and Presbitero Journal of Banking and Finance forthcoming
The effects of raising capital requirements on lending in a buoyant EM environment are small.
Bank Capital: A Seawall Approach with Dagher, Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, and Tong International Journal of Central Banking 2020
Risk-weighted bank capital of 15-23% would have prevented a majority of banking crises.
Covered in "Finance and Development".
Bailouts and Systemic Insurance with Dell'Ariccia Journal of Banking and Finance 2019
A government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently, despite moral hazard effects.
Global Liquidity and Cross-Border Bank Flows with Cerutti and Claessens Economic Policy 2017
Global liquidity is driven by US monetary policy but European bank conditions.
Summary on VOX.
Banking and Trading with Boot Review of Finance 2016
Bank Size, Capital, and Systemic Risk: Some International Evidence with Laeven and Tong Journal of Banking and Finance 2015
Systemic risk is driven primarily by insufficient capital in large banks.
Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management Journal of Financial Intermediation 2013
Effective disclosure complements liquidity buffers in ensuring banks' market access during crises.
Capital Regulation and Tail Risk with Perotti and Vlahu International Journal of Central Banking 2011
Better capitalized banks are less likely to accidentally breach the capital requirements, and so may take more risk.
Summary on VOX.
The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding with Huang Journal of Financial Intermediation 2011
The providers of wholesale funding can remain uninformed of bank fundamentals, and trigger inefficient liquidations based on imprecise public information.
The first paper (2008) to identify short-term wholesale funding as a source of bank vulnerability
Top citation for "wholesale funding" on Google Scholar.
Bank Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort Journal of Financial Intermediation 2009
Bank may hold insufficient liquidity and gamble for LOLR support, especially when other banks do the same.
Monetary Policy and Intangible Investment with Robin Döttling
Fintech: What's Old, What's New? with Arnoud Boot, Luc Laeven, and Peter Hoffmann Revise and resubmit
Financial Innovation and Technology: What's Old, What's New? (with Arnoud Boot, Luc Laeven, and Peter Hoffmann) ECB Discussion Paper 2438 On VOX
We contrast old trends and recent developments in financial innovation, focusing on information processing and customer communication.
COVID-19 and Non-Performing Loans: Lessons from Past Crises (with Anil Ari and Sophia Chen) ECB Research Bulletin 71 On VOX
NPL resolution post-COVID-19 will be challenged by high public debt, low bank profitability, and weak corporate balance sheets.
Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (with Jihad Dagher, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven, Hui Tong) IMF Staff Discussion Note 16/04
Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Stability (with Luc Laeven)
Bank corporate governance reforms may be useful, but cannot substitute for strong supervision.
Bank Size and Systemic Risk (with Luc Laeven and Hui Tong) IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/01
What Is Shadow Banking? (with Stijn Claessens) IMF WP 14/25
Defines shadow banking as "all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a public or private backstop to operate."
Banks may need 18% risk-weighted capital, 9% leverage to fully absorb asset shocks of the size seen in past crises in OECD countries.
Competition policy can support financial stability by dealing with "too-big-to fail" and facilitating crisis management.
Two key shadow banking functions -- securitization and collateral intermediation -- are economically valuable but pose systemic risk.
New Risks in Financial Intermediation, in IMF Global Financial Stability Report Oct 2012
Significant changes in the structure of the financial sector over the last decade have led to new systemic risks.
The economic rationale of macroprudential policy is to correct risk externalities: across financial institutions and from finance to the real economy.
Depository funding was a key determinant of banks stability during the 2008 crisis.
Other policy work
At the ECB
Fintech analysis co-lead in DG-Research
DG-Research work on post-COVID economic policy issues
Support to Capital Markets Union workstreams
Ex-post evaluation of Euro Area adjustment programs
IMF country experience
Missions to Korea (2016: corporate restructuring, financial sector, macroprudential policies)
Ad hoc work on EU issues, including A Banking Union for the Euro Area IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/01
IMF work on financial sector issues
Benefits and Costs of Corporate Debt Restructuring: An Estimation for Korea (with Jae Chung) 2016 IMF WP 16/204
Global Liquidity: Issues for Surveillance, IMF Board Paper, April 2014
Bank Funding and Financial Stability, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013
Progress toward a Safer Financial System, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2012
A Fair and Substantial Contribution, an IMF Report to G20 on Financial Sector Taxation, 2010
Government-Sponsored Financial Institutions in Advanced Economies (with Aditya Narain, 2006) IMF WP 07/227
At the Bank of England:
Lev Ratnovski is Lead Economist at the European Central Bank (Directorate General Research), on leave from the International Monetary Fund. He works on financial sector issues, such as fintech, liquidity, regulation, and crises. At the IMF, he covered Canada, China, Korea, Mongolia, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Ukraine, and USA. He has published in the Review of Financial Studies, Review of Finance, and Journal of Financial Intermediation, among other journals. His work has been cited by Bloomberg, Economist, and Reuters. Mr. Ratnovski started his career at the Bank of England after receiving a Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam.