An economist focusing on global banks and financial markets.
Currently writing on bank regulation and structure, shadow banking, and global liquidity.
Also covering economic policy in Ireland and Spain (2011-14) and Portugal and Ukraine (2014-).
- Liquidity and Transparency in Bank Risk Management J Fin Intermediation 2013
Liquidity buffers protect banks against small liquidity shocks; transparency/disclosure are essential to maintain market access during systemic stress.
- Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (with Enrico Perotti and Razvan Vlahu) Int J Central Banking 2011 On VOX
Banks with higher capital are less likely to breach the minimal capital ratio, and consequently may take more risk.
- The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding (with Rocco Huang) J Fin Intermediation 2011
The providers of wholesale funding may choose to remain uninformed of bank fundamentals, and trigger inefficient liquidations based on imprecise public information.
- The first paper (2008) to identify short-term wholesale funding as a pre-crisis bank vulnerability
- The top citation on "wholesale funding" on Google Scholar.
- Bank Liquidity Regulation and the Lender of Last Resort J Fin Intermediation 2009
Bank may hold insufficient liquidity and gamble for LOLR support, especially when other banks in the system do the same.
- Banking and Trading (with Arnoud Boot)
Banks may trade too much due to time inconsistency problems in capital allocation. These distortions became more acute in the last decade due to deeper financial markets.
- Bailouts and Systemic Insurance (with Giovanni Dell'Ariccia)
A government's commitment to shield banks from contagion may increase their incentives to invest prudently, despite potential moral hazard effects.
- Global Liquidity and Drivers of Cross-Border Bank Flows (with Eugenio Cerutti and Stijn Claessens) on VOX
Global liquidity driven by US monetary policy and European bank conditions. Borrowing counties can manage exposure through better macro framework, bank regulation, and capital controls.
- Bank Size, Capital, and Systemic Risk: Some International Evidence (with Luc Laeven and Hui Tong)
Systemic risk is primarily driven by insufficient capital in large banks.
- Bank Size, Activities, and Risk-Taking (with Natalia Martynova and Razvan Vlahu)
Profitable core business enables bank to take risk in side market-based activities. This explains incidence of risk-taking in profitable and stable financial firms, e.g. UBS or AIG.
- Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Stability (with Luc Laeven)
Bank corporate governance reforms may be useful, but cannot substitute for strong supervision.
- Bank Size and Systemic Risk (with Luc Laeven and Hui Tong) IMF Staff Discussion Note 14/01 On iMFdirect On VOX Cited by Stan Fischer
Large banks' market-based activities increase systemic but not standalone bank risk; offering a clear rationale for macroprudential policy.
- What Is Shadow Banking? IMF WP 14-25
Defines shadow banking as "all financial activities, except traditional banking, which require a public or private backstop to operate."
- How Much Capital Should Banks Have?
Banks may need 18% risk-weighted capital, 9% leverage to fully absorb asset shocks of the size seen in past crises in OECD countries.
- Competition Policy for Modern Banks IMF WP 13/126 On VOX Covered by Bloomberg
Competition policy can support financial stability by dealing with "too-big-to fail" and facilitating crisis management.
- Shadow Banking: Economics and Policy (with Stijn Claessens, Zoltan Poszar, and Manmohan Singh) IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/12 On VOX
Two key shadow banking functions -- securitization and collateral intermediation -- may be economically valuable but can pose systemic risk.
- New Risks in Financial Intermediation, in IMF Global Financial Stability Report, Oct 2012
Significant changes in the structure of the financial sector over the last decade have led to new systemic risks.
- Externalities and Macroprudential Policy (with Gianni De Nicolo and Giovanni Favara) IMF Staff Discussion Note 12/05 On VOX
The economic rationale of macroprudential policy is to correct market failures - risk externalities across financial institutions and from finance to the real economy.
- Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (with Rocco Huang, 2009), IMF WP 09/152 On VOX The dataset
Depository funding was a major factor for the stability of large OECD banks during the crisis. Canadian banks had significantly more deposits than OECD average.
- Country Work
- Covering economic policy in Portugal and Ukraine (2014-)
- Covering economic policy in Ireland and Spain (2011-2014)
- A Banking Union for the Euro Area IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/01
- U.S. Article IV 2009 (monetary policy), Canada Article IV 2009 (monetary policy, financial sector)
- Financial Sector
- Global Liquidity: Issues for Surveillance, IMF Board Paper, April 2014
- Bank Funding and Financial Stability, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013
- Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy, IMF Policy Paper, September 2013 See also a Background Paper
- Progress toward a Safer Financial System, Chapter 3 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2012
- Inflation Expectations and Commodity Prices, U.S. Article IV 2011 (with Oya Celasun and Roxana Mihet) IMF WP 12/89 A short version
- A Fair and Substantial Contribution, an IMF Report to G20 on Financial Sector Taxation, 2010
- Government-Sponsored Financial Institutions in Advanced Economies (with Aditya Narain, 2006) IMF WP 07/227
- At the Bank of England:
Лев Ратновский Lev Ratnovskiy,